

# MUSLIM REFORM AND THE JADIDS

Islamic history has witnessed enormous changes by engendered actions owing to emotional or intellectual intensity, as well as popular support. Sectarian controversy emerging very early in the development of Islam and thriving to this day is an obvious example. Two other manifestations of complaint however deserve our special attention because they underscore the vitality of Islamic civilisation through the centuries and represent modes of change predating "modern" notions of reform. The first has been Sufism, initially individual and ascetic, but overtly a mass movement organized in brotherhoods (*turuq*) pl. *tariqa*) with its stress on the inner awakening and moral reformation of the individual. Sufism attracted not only to the uneducated but also, at least in its more moderate expressions to many representatives of the Ulema.

The second has been the often right-wing orthodox call for communal revitalization, epitomized intellectually in the writings of Ibn Tamiyya (the thirteenth –fourteenth century Hanbali *alim* and realized in the numerous eighteenth –and nineteenth-century reform movements ranging from the Wahabi(Arabia) to the Idrisiya(North Africa) and the Faraizi (eastern Bengal) The relationship between Sufism and orthodox reformism does not succumb easily to generalization. There existed always a basic tension when it came to synthesising the former's methodology with the latter's doctrine as al-Ghazali attempted philosophically in the eleventh century. By the eighteenth century however evidence suggests that an integration of the two on a practical level was enjoying significant headway as Sufism absorbed the orthodox emphasis on the Quran hadith reports and the person of the prophet while reducing somewhat its own ecstatic practices and metaphysical tendencies. But Muslims have long accepted the legitimacy of periodic "renewal" (*tajdid*) of the community (*umma*)

As a modality of change *tajdid* had long served Islam's interests unchallenged, its power and legitimacy drawn from the larger discourse of which it was an expression. When much of the Islamic world since the eighteenth century, for reasons that still arouse intense debate, appeared to many to be in decline and seemed less and less capable of successfully handling the political,economic and ultimately cultural challenge from Western civilisation. A typical response intellectual and popular was a call for renewal. The West's challenge "proved" to be overwhelming, thereby forcing a revolutionary transformation in the minds of more and more Muslims, leading them to accept not only non-Islamic or western representations of the past and present but also and more importantly an alien non-traditional modality of change. It is this Jadidism that will be addressed now using the Russian Islamic context. Within that context two persons will be examined whose perspectives reflect the fundamental distinctions between classical Islamic and modernist approaches to reform: Abu Nasr Qursavi and Ismail Bey Gasprinskii. Qursavi was a renewer , not an innovator, an implementer or a challenger. He is described as such by a leading figure among soviet muslims today as he had been by two of the most prominent "Russian"ulama of the nineteenth century, Sihabbeddin Mercani and Riazeddin Fahreddin,who compared him favourably with the fourteenth century reformer al-Taftazani (Abdullah,1985:11) The call to be rightly guided, to restore the relationship between man and God and to place it again at the center of man's existence and to renew the umma make of Qursavi a mujadid. Qursavi deliberately upset many of his contemporaries by

questioning their perception and practice of Islam, but his criticisms never bore revolutionary implications. Among the Volga and Crimean Tartars, as well as Azerbaijanis and other Caucasian Muslims, the late eighteenth to middle nineteenth century produced numerous Ulama and Sufi adepts who echoed the complaints of Qursavi. A detailed study of this has not been made but a situation that repeats itself at every turn for Russian Islam it can be suggested that a list of such men would likely include Abdurrahim Utiz-Imeni (1754-1836) Abdulmanih Kargali (17892-1826), Ibatulla Salih (1794-1867) and Abelcebbar Kandali (1797-1860) from the Volga region as well as Mulla Panaha Vagif (1717-1797) Mulla Veli Vidali (1709-1809) and Zeynulabdin Sirvani (eighteenth century) from Azerbaijan and the Crimean Tartar Esmirza (1803-1883). In addition through the mid-third of the eighteenth century along the Volga, and later in Caucasia, the *tajdid* modality of change found expression in mass movements frequently inspired by Sufi Turuq and directed largely against Russian colonialism. The calls for jihad (holy war) by Imam Mansur (1785-1791), Shaikh Muhammad of Yaraglar (1825) and Imam Samil (1834-1859) are but three examples.<sup>1</sup>

Colonial relations between Russia and her Muslim subjects encouraged however a reformist spirit of a qualitatively different kind. This fostered the emergence of a cadre of Russianized Muslims whose *weltanschauung* reflected the effects of increasing Russian culture and various amounts of the “modernism” in which the greater Western complex was caught up. Some of these ‘new’, like Muslims like Abbas Kuli Aga Bakihanov (1794-1848) Mirza Fetali Ahundov (1812-1878) to name a few had actively participated fully in the Russian side of imperial life. Some ceased to be religious or even converted to Christianity as did Kazem Bek.<sup>2</sup> But we understand there were also some who adapted aspects of modern culture without sacrificing as much of their Islamic identity in the process although much research is being done in this field. Through the collection of their writings all contributed to some measure to an emergence of a modernist discourse in their own native cultural milieu.

Stirrings of reform appeared in Central Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Reform movements among other Muslims of the Russian empire especially Tartar reformers played a crucial role in the development of the Central Asian reform movement and ideology. The modernist discourse that was mentioned was popularly known as *Jadidism*. This had its most influential advocate in a Crimean Tartar Ismail Bey Gaprinski (1851-1914) who devoted his entire adult life to the goal of rendering the “new method” (*usul-al-jadid*) acceptable to his co-religionists. A key element in this program was education, and the goal was to replace traditional education with modern secular education. A remarkable analogy can be drawn with that of British India in late 19<sup>th</sup> century when the great Mughal reformer Sir Syed Ahmed Khan decided to break away with the old traditions of Islamic education and merge with the system of British education. Sir Syed believed that sentimentality and emotion with old traditions of education was destructive to the progress of his community which was falling back so dangerously behind their Hindu counterparts. Thus Tartar reform was a part of a wider trend in the Muslim world during the nineteenth century. One can categorise various intellectual responses to the changing conditions in the Muslim world at the time. Three main positions can be singled out. One argued for the primacy of political concerns, recognizing as legitimate any adaptation that

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<sup>1</sup> Reference taken from chapter titled ‘The Jadid Response to Pressure for change’ by Edward J. Lazzerini from the book titled *Muslims in Central Asia, expressions of identity and change* ed. by Jo -- Ann Gross.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*

facilitated the achievement of political goals . (In particular this related to the question of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire) This was opposed by as second position that was based on Islam and argued that politics was irrelevant if it did not allow for the preservation of Islam. A middle way was represented by Islamic modernism the intellectual current to which Muslim reformers of the Russian Empire were most closely affiliated . Islamic modernism prescribed adaptation but not any cost. Reforms were both desirable and fully compatible with Islamic traditions, and they should be based on arguments congenial to Muslims. This was the general solution presented by the main architects of Islamic modernism, such as Jamal-ud-din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905)

According to John Voll there are three primary responses to western expansion in the Muslim world. The first he calls “adaptionist Westernizers”, the second is a militant reaction, whereas the third response involves a revivalist activism but no westernising reform programs or Islamic modernism<sup>3</sup> While militant reaction was seen in the Caucasus, the Tartar’s reaction was certainly adaptionist. Adeeb Khalid argues that Tartar reformers were largely recruited from ‘aristocratic elites that had been co-opted into the Russian social *hierarchy*.’ Apart from being adaptionist Tartar reform project clearly belonged to the tradition of Islamic modernism. Gaprinsky had propagated a new kind of education similar to that offered in the Ottoman Empire during the pragmatic reforms of the nineteenth century. As it was in the case of other Muslim reforms throughout the world these changes too challenged the authority of the *Ulema* creating thereby tension between *Ulema* traditionalists and the modernizers. The advantage with these reforms promulgated by the Tartars is that these involved the establishment of civic institutions as well as the improvement of women

Among the Tartar reformers, new visions of identity appeared, notably the concept of pan-Turkism. The appearance of pan-Turkism must be seen in the light of pan-Slavism, but it was also a part of an intellectual trend in the wider Muslim world. In the Ottoman empire these currents were initially most prominent among various non-Turk *millets*<sup>4</sup> As part of the reforms in Ottoman administration in the 1860s the administration of these *millets* was secularized as it was earlier dominated by the higher clergy in the respective religious communities. The formation of these *millets* however fostered national and separatist tendencies contrary to hopes that it would pave a way for a uniform government for the entire Ottoman Empire! The Tartars of the Russian Empire focussed neither on historic continuity nor on territorial aspects. Instead their pan-Turkic project stressed the community of all Turks, a giant fictive “super family”.

In addition to Gaprinsky another leading pan-Turkist was Yusuf Akcura born in the Russian Empire. In 1904 Akcura presented his pan-Turkic manifest *Three kinds of policy*, in which he argued that the strategies of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism<sup>5</sup> would be met with definite hostility by the world powers, in relation to which the Ottoman Empire was ‘clearly inferior’ at this point. Pan-Turkism would be acceptable to all the powers except Russia. This Pan-Turkic program, was hardly very successful. Among the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, there was little support for these ideas, and even

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<sup>3</sup> Voll, J, 1994:85

<sup>4</sup> Millets can be described as the administrative units in the Ottoman Empire for the non-Muslim community, organized on the basis of religious affiliation rather than ethnic origin.

<sup>5</sup> In the nineteenth century a new doctrine appeared in the Ottoman Empire, claiming that the Sultan was the rightful Caliph, having inherited the office from the last Abbasid Caliph. From 1860 this pan-Islamic claim was used to justify Ottoman interests in Turkestan, from then on under Russian control (Yapp 1987:181ff.)

the Young Turks largely stuck to its predecessors: Ottomanism, centralization and modernization (Yapp 1987:194)

However, the significance of this Turkist or pan-Turkist rhetoric and ideology may have been greater on another level. According to Adeeb Khalid, "the more basic idea of the affinity of various Turkic groups, and the knowledge of their Turkness, rapidly suffused all notions of identity in the Turkic world"<sup>6</sup>. This was the case I believe with the Jadids of Central Asia as well, and their understandings of and visions of community.

Without any doubt the Tatar Jadids played an important role in the development of a Central Asian reform project. First, the Tatar newspapers published in Russia were widely read. This was particularly the case with Gaprinsky's own *Terjuman* while other Tatar papers won considerable popularity in Central Asia as well. The Tatar press introduced ideas of reform and served as a model for the Central Asian press that developed after 1905<sup>7</sup> Of the 1000 individuals who subscribed to *Terjuman* approximately 200 were located in Central Asia<sup>8</sup>. Second Tatar Jadidism contributed to the Central Asian reform project in that the in that the reformed schools in Central Asia made use of Tatar text books and many reformed schools in Central Asia had Tatar teachers<sup>9</sup> In fact one of the first new-method schools in Central Asia was opened by Gaprinsky himself in Samarkhand in 1893. Elsewhere in the region, new-method schools also opened with Tatar instructors for both Tatar and Turkestani boys.<sup>10</sup>

So the role of the Tatars was substantial, although Khalid is correct in stating that Central Asian reformism should not be considered "a pale reflection of a better organized movement in European Russia"<sup>11</sup> (1998:90ff) has documented that 'as far as the interrelation between Tartars and Central Asians is concerned it was a complex one. Tartars saw themselves as leaders vis-à-vis the Central Asians, a position not necessarily congenial to the Central Asians themselves, who had their ambitions. Moreover Tartars often felt Central Asia strange to them'. So one can believe that there were certainly important similarities between Tatar society and Central Asia. In both cases the population was predominantly "Turkic" from a linguistic point of view and the great majority of the population identified themselves as "Muslim". At the same time there existed great economic, social and cultural differences.

Education was a cornerstone in the reform project in Central Asia and the first reformed schools were opened in Turk Stan during the 1890s. The new -method schools were to represent an alternative to the traditional system of education, as it existed in the mantas (clergy-run primary schools mostly held in mosques). While the reformed education among the Tatars became, within a short time, the predominant form of education the reformed schools did not achieve any hegemonic position in Central Asia. They remained grossly outnumbered by more traditional schools.<sup>12</sup> The first efforts to have reform schools in Bukhara were made by the Tatars around the turn of the century though the attempts in the first decade of the twentieth century were unsuccessful. But in 1908 the Emir authorized the established of reformed

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<sup>6</sup> Adeeb, Khalid 1998:98

<sup>7</sup> Carriere deEncausse 1989a:189

<sup>8</sup> Allworth 1990:131

<sup>9</sup> The extensive presence of Tatars in reformed schools led to new legislation in 1907 which required teachers in elementary schools for the natives of Central Asia to be either Russians or of the same group as the students (Khalid 1998:182)

<sup>10</sup> Allworth 1990:131

<sup>11</sup> See Khalid 1998:90

<sup>12</sup> Allworth 1990:139

school for the children of his subjects<sup>13</sup> The Bukharan Jadid's battle was tough one and their main adversary was the Emir. The most prominent names among the Bukharan Jadids are Fitrat and Fayzullah Khojaev. The first was particularly influential in the period prior to Bolshevik rule, while Khojaev became the most influential Central Asian in the first years of Communist rule in Central Asia. According to Becker (1968:11) printing press was virtually unknown in the region prior to Russian conquest. In the Tsarist period, Jadid reformers strove to establish a press that would serve as a forum for the redistribution of reform ideas. But these are understood to be not so successful although the press represented something and an important element in the project of the Central Asian Jadids. More noteworthy ideas were the distribution of poetry, literature and drama. It is indicative of Jadidism's intellectual break with tradition that they introduced new forms of expression to Central Asia, such as prose, fiction and drama.

In Soviet scholarship, the Jadid reform movement in Central Asia was presented as an entirely class-based phenomenon. As a consequence of the integration of Central Asia into the Russian Empire and thus global capitalism, a bourgeoisie, primarily consisting of wealthy merchants, began to form in the region. According to Soviet historians like Vakhobov the Jadid movement was 'neither more nor less than a phenomenon expressing and representing the interests of this developing class' (Vakhobov 1961) Relating the Jadid movement to class was not incorrect. The Jadids represented no popular movement. Members were invariably urban and the movement among what might be called the bourgeoisie. As far as membership is concerned therefore the movement did exhibit a distinctive class character. Moreover the Jadids Of Central Asia enjoyed the financial support of wealthy merchants, although not to the same extent as the Tatar reformers. Among the Tatars, capitalism and class differentiation was much more developed<sup>14</sup>

Differences in interpretations of the Jadid movement between Soviet and Western scholars are typical of the polarization of the Cold war period. While Soviet scholars focussed on new social and economic structures, many western scholars have focussed on the alleged anti-Russian character of Jadidism, seeing it first and foremost as a response to colonization and foreign dominance. In this perspective reform was not an end in itself, but a means by which a main goal could be accomplished: liberation from Russia in this view primarily a political phenomenon with cultural reform as a major weapon. Carriere d'Encausse maintains that "the final goal was to liberate Dar-ul-Islam from the Infidels' domination". Similarly Abduvakhitov maintains that "national liberation" was among the Jadid's main goals.<sup>15</sup> The Jadid movement was a nationalist response to colonization, nationalism here manifesting as hostility to foreign rule<sup>16</sup> This is, however a problematic view which can be demonstrated by the attitudes of the Jadid leaders during the revolt of 1916. According to Carriere d'Encausse: "the leaders of the Turkestani reformist movement came out resolutely against the decision" to mobilize Central Asians in working brigades. In her presentation Jadids are anti-Russian separatists, sympathetic

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<sup>13</sup> Carriere d'Encausse 1998:83ff

<sup>14</sup> The Bukharan Jadids, for instance received invaluable material help from wealthy reform-minded merchants (Carriere d'Encausse 1988:88)

<sup>15</sup> Carriere d'Encausse 1989a:206, Abduvakhitov 1994:70

<sup>16</sup> Geoffrey Wheeler maintained that "since the peoples of Central Asia had not yet been affected by national consciousness and had not yet drunk the heady wine of genuine or synthetic nationalism, they were not offended by the phenomenon of alien rule" (Wheeler 1964:96)

to the revolt.<sup>17</sup> However not much evidence is provided. In the discussion of the 1916 revolt in Soviet journals in the mid-1920s, it was convincingly claimed that on the contrary the Jadids were opposed to the revolt and separatism had not been on their agenda. This seems to have been accepted by all participants in the discussion at the time, irrespective of attitudes towards the events of 1916 according to some Soviet scholars. Recent research appears to support this view.

The Jadid movement was exclusively urban. It had little contact with the rural population and even less with the nomads, who played the leading role in the revolt of 1916. The revolt therefore took place in surroundings with which the Jadids were quite unfamiliar. Given this fact, it seems quite unlikely that the Jadids should have played any important part in the events. On the contrary they opposed the entire revolt. Adeeb Khalid has documented that leading Jadids not only opposed it, they were in fact enthusiastic about the recruitment of Central Asians that led to the outbreak of the revolt.<sup>18</sup> This does not fit very well with the idea of Jadidism as a primarily anti-Russian phenomenon. Khalid has introduced a more fruitful perspective. Of cultural reform, in which Jadidism is seen more as a result of factors internal to Central Asia than as a response to colonization or foreign rule.

Education was at the heart of Jadid activities. A more secularised type of education was introduced in much of the Muslim world in the nineteenth century, but it was pragmatism that triggered the reforms. A new kind of education was necessary in order to increase efficiency. For the Jadids of Central Asia reforming the educational system was not simply about efficiency and pragmatic considerations. The plans for reform reflected the Jadid's world view, which in Khalid's words was dominated by a perception of "knowledge as salvation"<sup>19</sup> Rather than a dichotomy of native as opposed to Russian, what predominated in Jadid thought was the opposition between "progress" and "backwardness" or "decay". In the eyes of the Jadids, Central Asian society was in a state of decay. Moral decay had led to prostitution, alcohol and drug usage, and to other un-Islamic practices. The essence of the political decay was the subordination of the region to Russia. For the Jadids moral decay and Russia's political dominance were really two sides of the same problem and it is important to note that Russian dominance was a symptom rather than the problem itself.<sup>20</sup> It was the most prominent symptom of the disease of backwardness which troubled Central Asian society, and from which it had to be saved. If this did not happen, prospects were dismal. Manawar Qari put it in this way in 1906:

If we continue in this way for another five or ten years we are in the danger of being dispersed and effaced under the oppression of developed nations ....O coreligionists, O compatriots! Let's be just and compare our situation with that of other, advanced nations. ...Let's secure the future of our coming generations....and save them from becoming slaves and servants of others

What was at stake therefore was much more than political sovereignty..It was the continued existence of Central Asian culture, or more precisely Central Asian culture as perceived by the Jadids.

The reason for the decay was ignorance All the ills that plagued Central Asia could be traced back to the lack of knowledge, which was the result not of Russia's recent conquest of the region but of long-term tendencies. In the Jadid perception, the disastrous ignorance was the result of moral corruption within the religious and societal elite Occupied exclusively with their own position and material well being the

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<sup>17</sup> Carriere d'Encausse 1988,120

<sup>18</sup> Khalid 1998:241

<sup>19</sup> Khalid 1998:chapter5

<sup>20</sup> Khalid 1998:136

*Ulema* had neglected the interests of the Central Asian Society, which in the eyes of the Jadids deprived the *Ulama* of their legitimate authority.<sup>21</sup> This clearly demonstrates the differences between Jadid thought and the notions upon which *Ulama* authority was based. The latter was based entirely on religion, that is, on the acceptance by others of their specialized religious knowledge and competence. Accommodating the interests of society, however defined, was not a part of the *Ulama*'s claim to authority. For the Jadids, however, the interests of society were at the centre of attention.

In Khalid's perspective on Jadidism, the main adversary of the movement was the traditional elite of Central Asia, and not Russians or the Russian regime. The failure of the traditional elite was the main reason for Central Asia's troubles; the Jadid reform project was formulated on this background. Attitudes towards Russia, on the other hand, were far from unequivocally antagonistic. In his detailed analysis of Jadid texts, Khalid finds an image of Russia that is generally positive. The reason is that from the point of view of the Jadids, Russia could be a useful temporary ally that could make it easier to facilitate the accomplishment of the program of modernization and reform. Russia produced the conditions that made reform possible.

On the matter of Jadid attitudes towards Russia, one may therefore distinguish between a short-term and a long-term perspective. Certainly, in the long term, the goal of the Jadids was for Central Asia to become independent of Russia. Certainly in the long term the goal of the Jadids was for Central Asia to become independent of Russia. But in the short term they believed that the same Russia might help to reach this goal. Consequently, the Jadids did not represent "nationalism" in the sense of embodying a reaction to foreign dominance. Nevertheless it might be argued that Jadid thinking introduced the idea of the nation and the national community to Central Asia and that Jadidism, in this sense, represented a presage to the territorial political reorganization of the 1920s.

### **The Jadids, nation and politics**

If nationalism is exclusively understood as a political phenomenon aimed primarily at achieving the political sovereignty of a particular group of people defined as a nation, the Jadid's cooperation policy towards Russia would make any link between Jadidism and nationalism impossible. Nationalism is as much a cultural as well a political movement. In the literature on nationalism, several scholars make a distinction between an ethnic and a civic national community<sup>22</sup> There was certainly a "civic element" present in Jadid thinking. This was expressed through the Jadid's emphasis on the "interests of society" or by extension, its members or citizens. Focussing on the interests of society, the Jadids challenged the legitimacy and claims to authority of the traditional elites, and in particular the *Ulema*. This represented a break with Central Asian traditions. In the three dynastic states of Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand, the source of legitimacy was of a religious or theological character, while the interests of the population were not an issue.

Like the traditional elites of the *Ulema*, in the final analysis the Jadids based their arguments on Islam. This was typical of Islamic modernism, with its ambition to reconcile Islam and western-style modernity. In the reformed schools of the Jadids, Islam and religious subjects also held a central place. Using as an example Munawwar Qari's school, Carriere d'Encausse argues that, "despite the anxieties expressed by the *qadimis* (the traditional elites) religion lost none of its rights there (in the reformed

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<sup>21</sup> Khalid 1998:150

<sup>22</sup> Smith 1991:8ff

schools of Central Asia)”<sup>23</sup> She goes on to emphasise the fact that” 44 per cent of the local timetable of the school was devoted to purely religious subjects, and concludes that secular education (arithmetic, geography and the exact sciences) was in reality very limited, amounting to only 20 per cent of the time table”<sup>24</sup> What this strictly based argument misses is meaning . It says nothing about the ways in which the “purely religious subjects” were taught. It can therefore witness continuity primarily on a *nominal* level.

From this perspective Adeeb Khalid has found important differences between the “Islam” of the *Ulema* and that of the Jadids. The Islam taught by the Jadids was less absolute than the Islam on which Ulama authority was based. The distinction introduced between Islam and other kinds of knowledge implied that Islam was no longer all- embracing but occupied its own separate space, however sizeable. Islam was contextualized and historicized and the teaching of Islamic history made Islam subject to knowledge that was essentially worldly in character<sup>25</sup>. To a great extent, this represents a transformation of Islam from the realm of religious dogma to that of secular culture, and this Islamic culture became crucial in Jadid thinking about groups and identities. The Jadids sought to make their reform program compatible with the basic elements of this secularized Islam, but arguments for Islam were always based on what was good for the members of society. Any phenomenon was evaluated on the background of its supposed effects on society, as the essential aim of Jadid reform was to improve conditions in all spheres: health-care, culture, morality, economy and so on<sup>26</sup>

Indeed it was the nation (*millet*) that became the focus of the Jadid reforms. Although the Jadids emphasized their reforms were in accordance with Islamic principles, their ultimate legitimisation was to be found in their effects on worldly society, on the *millet*<sup>27</sup>. The Jadids called for a new kind of solidarity with the community. Accused by the traditional elites of disregarding Islam, Jadids such as Fitrat responded that the reformed schools not only strove to make their students good Muslims, but to make them patriots to their *millat* as well, arguing that there was no contradiction between the two.<sup>28</sup> Both the focus on what is good for society and the idea of solidarity with “significant sectors of the population”, as Smith puts it; represent important elements in the culture of national identity.

What was the territorial dimension in the Jadid’s thoughts about community? Some scholars have stressed that the Jadids continued a tradition where the territorial aspect had little importance, and the arguments have been based on the existence of different pan- movements or ideologies. First there is the notion of Pan-Islamism. According to Alexander Bennigsen, the Jadid movement in Central Asia soon took on the character of a pan-Islamic movement.<sup>29</sup> Understood in political terms, the ultimate goal for a pan-Islamic movement would be a political unification of all Muslims. This was however not the goal of the Jadid movement of Central Asia, nor of any group. Instead various notions of pan-Islamism existed, but none of them really existed, but none of them really focussed on the political unification of all Muslims. Within Tsar-Russia’s Central Asian administration, fear of pan-Islamism was strong. In the

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<sup>23</sup> Carriere d’Encausse 1988:112

<sup>24</sup> Carriere d’Encausse 1988:86-7

<sup>25</sup> Khalid 1998: 172ff

<sup>26</sup> Khalid 1998: especially chapter 5

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup> Carriere d’Encausse 1998:112

<sup>29</sup> Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejourné 1964



Ottoman Empire, rulers had used the idea of pan-Islamism to increase or maintain influence in regions with Muslim population, but political unification had not really been the goal.<sup>30</sup> Different identities do not exclude each other (Pakistan is a good example) and identifying with a comprehensive unit such as the “world of Muslims” is not the same as maintaining that all Muslims ought to unite in a political sense. While the Jadids recognized themselves as part of a comprehensive Muslim community, Turkestan remained the frame of their political activities. Second the Jadids have been associated with the ideology of Pan-Turkism with its ultimate goal of the unity of the Turkic peoples of the world. Indeed, pan-Turkism had played a role among the Tatars, who strove to strengthen the connection between themselves and the Turkic speaking populations of Central Asia as well as the Ottoman Empire. Among the Jadids of Central Asia however, Turkic unity was not an issue, which is witnessed by the fact that the Jadids supported not only the conscription of Central Asians in 1916, but also indeed the entire war against the Ottoman Turks<sup>31</sup>

What the Jadids thought about groups and communities is one thing. A very different question is the implications of these thoughts for Central Asian society in general. Theoretically, the Jadids might have remained a marginal group without any significant influence whatsoever. Indeed, this is what they were at first. After the revolution however their status changed. When the Jadid movement developed in Central Asia in the first decade of the twentieth century, it consisted largely of young men who managed to occupy a new social space created by the establishment of Russian dominance in the region. Towards 1917, the movement grew, but its influence remained limited, much as a result of Tsar-Russia’s attitude towards it. Until the revolution, Central Asian society was characterized by a triangular relationship in which the groups and actors included Tsarist Russia, the traditional elites and finally the Central Asian reformers. In this relationship Russia however held the ultimate power, a fact not contested by the two other groups. While the Jadids favoured a short-term alliance with Russia for long-term benefits, they did not meet the desired response on the part of the Russian authorities that instead chose to support the traditional elite. There was also fear that the young reformers represented a potential for mobilization that was<sup>32</sup> or at least could become, a threat to Russian interests.

By 1917, the movement had developed from its modest beginnings around the turn of the century, but its relations to the traditional elite and to the Tsarist authorities remained the same.

It was only the political upheavals of 1917 that dramatically altered the situation as this dramatic year had the effect of demonstrating that their project held limited appeal for the Central Asian population. However as the situation developed throughout the year, the Jadids and the Ulema came to be concentrated in their respective organisations. The reform-minded Turkestanians had gathered in the Shura –yi Islamiya (Council of Islam)<sup>33</sup>. The Shura had originally joined with the conservatives of the traditional elites, forming together the central council of Muslims

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<sup>30</sup> Yapp 1987:181

<sup>31</sup> The supportive attitude of the Jadids towards Russian war efforts in World War I is clearly demonstrated by Khalid, who points to Jadid poetry of the time unequivocally supporting Russia in the war (Khalid 1998:241)

<sup>32</sup> According to Khalid “Russian officialdom mistook the striving for inclusion for separatism” (Khalid 1998:261)

<sup>33</sup> Allworth 1990:191

(also called “the National Council”). However these groups split, and the conservatives formed their own organization, called the Ulama Jamayati who won an overwhelming victory during the Tashkent elections and simultaneously revealed the limited appeal of reformism<sup>34</sup>

The Social forces at work in Central Asia were therefore hardly in favour of the Jadids and their project. Quite soon however Central Asia was to be dominated by forces based outside the region as the Bolsheviks and their red Army won control of Central Asia in the civil war. Once again military force required to maintain political control. In alliance with the Bolsheviks, the Jadids of Central Asia now won positions and a level of influence that until then had been unthinkable. But after the revolution promises were not kept as the Russian Congress rejected a proposal for a coalition with the Ulama Jamiyati. But on July 1910, 1919 a directive from Moscow ordered proportional representation for Muslims in party and state organs. The number of Muslims who now entered party organs greatly exceeded those who had been active in threaded movement. Nevertheless according to Khalid, even if the Jadids themselves did not represent a majority group among the Muslim communists, these Central Asian communists “represented in many ways a direct connection with the main thrust of Jadidism”<sup>35</sup> Roger Kangas however notes that there were “striking parallels between the Bolshevik project and that of the Jadids”.

He obviously meant that both aimed at modernization, and I feel that while their ultimate goals diverged enormously nevertheless, both projects strove for a reformation of society based on secular knowledge and enlightenment.

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<sup>34</sup> election results presented in Khalid 1998:91

<sup>35</sup> Khalid 1998:289