

The concern of this essay is the position of the 'Republic of Cyprus'<sup>1</sup>, the neighbouring states of Turkey and Greece and other states with interests, historically or otherwise, linked to the island, including the UK and the USA. Although this dispute is not so violently demonstrated as in other areas, notably Israel with regards to the Palestinians or Iraq and the Kurd population, the position and disputes that surround Cyprus are just as important and in many ways unique. The two main parties involved are Greece and Turkey; both are members of NATO and either a member or an aspiring member of the EU. The very unconventional nature of the situation means that the diplomatic approaches used by the participants is also unconventional. The lack of Cypriot Turk embassies in foreign countries means many usual forms of diplomacy have no place. Therefore, the focus of this essay will be the less obvious diplomatic advances in use, as will be set out later.

The chief purpose of diplomacy, It can be said, is to "enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policy without resorting to force, propaganda or law"<sup>2</sup>. This definition, therefore, encompasses much more than the traditional perspective of Embassies or conferences. Diplomacy does include these types of arrangements, but also informal discussions, 'Telephone diplomacy', and the lobbying of foreign governments. This essay will first take a brief look at the historical perspective of the island. This is crucial to understanding the importance of Cyprus to the various parties involved. Secondly, this essay will examine the role of 'new' forms of diplomacy in situations of crisis, with reference to the 1974 Turk invasion. Following this, the use of 'public diplomacy' such as the lobbying of foreign government and parties by both sides will be examined and how this can be crucial for gaining international support. Subsequently, the key role played by the E.U will be studied, notably how, as Greece, Turkey and Cyprus use their positions within, or regarding these institutions to their advantage regarding the issue of Cyprus. Finally, the ramifications of the new 'War on Terrorism' and its influence of US-Turkey relations will be looked at. It is important to note that this essay will forego implicit discussion of direct

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<sup>1</sup> Including the largely unrecognised 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. Hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Cyprus', unless otherwise stated.

negotiations between the Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks. This is done as these negotiations, albeit immensely important in the hope to secure peace, do not act to gain 'support for their position', which is the prime concern of this essay.

Before the various diplomatic efforts of the key participants are analysed, it is necessary to briefly examine the historical perspective of the situation. 1960 saw the creation of the constitution of the 'Republic of Cyprus' created jointly by Britain, Greece and Turkey. All three states served as Guarantors of the constitution, which meant that any breach of the constitution, could result in intervention by any of the said states. This constitution created a bi-communal state, which gave veto powers over many issues to both the Cypriot Greek and Cypriot Turk representatives. An important factor included was the exclusion of the possibility that Cyprus could join either partially or wholly, with another state. This was done to quell fears among Cypriot Turks that the government could force *Enosis*, the idea of Cyprus as part of Greece. However, due to the veto powers held by the Cypriot Turk minority, and the use of these over many issues, many Cypriot Greeks found the constitution 'unworkable'.<sup>3</sup> Years of inter-communal violence followed and measures taken by President Makarios reduced the influence of the Cypriot Turk minority on policy significantly. In fact, many have accused the Cypriot Greek former president of many violent atrocities, as former US Under-Secretary of State, George W. Ball comments, "Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots."<sup>4</sup> In 1974, a military coup took place in Cyprus which was 'backed' by the Junta in control of Greece. The Turkish government, and others, saw this as a breach of the constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee, arguing it was an attempt at *Enosis* and invaded the island, taking control of a large part of the north. Democratic rule returned to Cyprus, as well as Greece, yet the Turkish troops remain,

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<sup>2</sup> Berridge, G. R., *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), (London, Palgrave, 2002) p.1

<sup>3</sup> Kyriakides, S., *Cyprus Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, (Philadelphia, UPP, 1968), p.108

<sup>4</sup> Ball, G. W., *The Past Has Another Pattern : Memoirs*, (New York, Norton, 1982) p.310

currently numbering 30,000<sup>5</sup>. Many diplomatic efforts were made to resolve the situation, many of which will be discussed later, yet the situation remained. Following this, a United Nations peace-keeping force (UNIFCYP) was established on the island and set up a 'buffer-zone' between the predominantly Cypriot Greek' south and the Cypriot Turk north. In 1983, the Cypriot Turk leadership declared the creation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) as a separate state. However, only Turkey recognises the existence of this as an independent, sovereign state. The situation at the time of writing is little changed from 1983, although many diplomatic efforts have been taken by many different organisations, including the U.N, N.A.T.O and the European Union.

The key problem facing Cyprus, in a very simplified form, is one of 'minorities'<sup>6</sup>. The Cypriot Greek leadership claim their desire is for a unified Cyprus, yet the Cypriot Turks feel the Greek population has no claim to land settled by Turks in the sixteenth century and wish to protect the Turk minority on the island.

High-level diplomacy, between heads' of states or leaders, often takes place in times of crisis. One form of this often used is 'telephone diplomacy'.<sup>7</sup> The crucial aspects that this allows is the immediacy of its effects and the knowledge that messages get received. In 1974, on the day of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, many calls were made between the relevant parties. James Callaghan, the Prime Minister at the time, speaks of a 'day of mad activity'<sup>8</sup>, in which calls were made to the Turkish President, the Greek foreign minister, the French foreign minister and in particular US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. These, and calls between others, must have had some effect on the securing of cease-fire only three days afterwards. Such swift action would surely have been made impossible without the existence of direct, high-level diplomacy.

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<sup>5</sup> European Commission, *2000 regular report from the Commission on Cyprus' progress towards accession*, (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications, 2000) p.9

<sup>6</sup> Dodd, C. H., *The Cyprus Issue: A Current Perspective* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), (Eothen Press, 1995), p.2

<sup>7</sup> Berridge, op. cit., p.92

<sup>8</sup> Callaghan, J., *Time and Chance*, (London, Collins, 1987) pp. 342-6

The lobbying of foreign governments may not at first seem a form of diplomacy, neither does the use of media on the population of a foreign country, it seems more like propaganda. Yet both these play the important diplomatic roles, using the definition given earlier, of influencing a foreign government policy towards the situation. This approach is known as ‘public diplomacy’<sup>9</sup>, and both the Greek and Turkish sides have used this in attempts to win support. For example, Greek-American organisations have had influence on US foreign policy. In the Clinton administration, one policy advisor was George Stephanopoulos, who many have seen as key in influencing the foreign policy regarding Greece or Greek interests<sup>10</sup>. The Cypriot Turk side has also used public diplomacy to its advantage. The ‘Friends of Turkish Cypriots’ is a cross-parliamentary group in the British House of Commons. Although the UK, like all countries except Turkey, does not recognise the TRNC and has no official ties with it, this group has met many times with Cypriot Turk leaders, including Raul Denktat. This has given them the ability to present their views to the foreign office or express them in parliament. Also, other groups act to lobby governments, such as the Turkish Cypriot Network, set up in the UK in 1995. It lists among its aims and activities that it “lobbies parliamentarians and local and national politicians...in order to promote the just cause of the Turkish Cypriots...and the recognition of the TRNC”<sup>11</sup>

The role of the European Union is very crucial to the Cyprus situation. Greece is a member of the EU and Cyprus has applied for membership in the next stage of enlargement. Turkey, also, has had its aims at EU membership ‘acknowledged’ at the EU summit in 1999 at Helsinki. When Cyprus applied for membership, the government was made up of only Cypriot Greek representatives. The Cypriot Turk leadership protested that this application did not represent the views of what they saw as the independent TRNC, and therefore should not apply to the ‘north’.

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<sup>9</sup> Berridge, *op. cit.*, p.125

<sup>10</sup> Woodward, B., *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House*, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994) pp.156-7

<sup>11</sup> [www.tcn-cy.freeuk.com/aims.htm](http://www.tcn-cy.freeuk.com/aims.htm)

The TRNC and the Turkish government have reiterated this point on many occasions. At the European summit at Helsinki in 1999, it was agreed that Cyprus would go through the process of accession to the EU, however a settlement of the dispute would be beneficial, it would not be a precondition of joining. This has affected the diplomatic approach used by the Cypriot Greek and Greek governments. The European Union, as a part of its founding principles, promotes certain 'freedoms', notably in this instance, those of movement, settlement and the right to own property. These 'three freedoms' have often been core points made by the Cypriot Greeks in bi-lateral negotiations with the Cypriot Turks, in 1977 and 1979<sup>12</sup>, because theoretically they would allow Cypriot Greek to return to the north, thus stripping the Cypriot Turk majority in that area. By stressing these points, the Cypriot Greek diplomats are appealing to the E.U's own very nature. By using this approach the Cypriot Greek government are casting the Turkish side as being contradictory to the founding principles of the E.U, which may act to promote support for the Cypriot Greek position within other member states. Turkey and the Cypriot Turk leadership have also appealed to the 'founding principles' of the EU in its diplomatic efforts. Although not officially recognised, realistically the TRNC governs the north part of Cyprus. This has allowed them to cite reference to 'self-determination', one of both the EU's and UN's founding principles, for the Cypriot Turks as a basis for their autonomy, through press releases<sup>13</sup> and Turkish representations to the EU and UN<sup>14</sup>

Cyprus' membership of the EU prior to a political settlement would place Turkey in the very difficult position of militarily occupying a member state. This has caused Turkey to maximise its influence in halting, or a least slowing, Cyprus' negotiation for membership. This has been expressed in many ways. 'Threats' made by Turkey include the annexation of the 'TRNC' if

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<sup>12</sup> Dodd, *op. cit.*, p. 8-9

<sup>13</sup> see [www.trncinfo.com](http://www.trncinfo.com)

<sup>14</sup> Necatigil, Z. M., *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in international Law*, (Oxford, OUP, 1996) pp. 221-3

Cyprus' accession to the EU goes forward, although this particular course of action has been withdrawn.<sup>15</sup>

Since the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, there has been what George W. Bush claims, a 'War on Terrorism'. The role of Turkey in this new era cannot be understated. Turkey is in a unique position as a NATO ally, potential EU member and the only country of its kind to have an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Its geographical location also provides access to states of Iraq, Iran and other of what many call 'rogue states' or even, obtusely 'Axis of Evil'<sup>16</sup>. To ensure the 'War on Terrorism' is not perceived as a 'War on Islam', a threat very possible and feared by the 'western' leaders, Turkey's support has been invaluable<sup>17</sup>. This has given Turkey a unique opportunity to use its influence with the US to gather more support for the recognition of the TRNC. Although there is no evidence of 'bargaining' of support for recognition, the increased importance of Turkey to the USA no doubt will provide more avenues for diplomatic approaches. Although this itself could not realistically be defined as diplomacy, the diplomatic advantages it brings make it important to the situation

The aim of this essay was to examine the 'diplomatic approaches' used by the two sides of the 'Cyprus Question' and their respective 'mother' countries. Given the unconventional situation of Cyprus, this has been done by examining the more unusual or informal methods of diplomacy. For example, even the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which has been far more violent and threatening to world security, is not as unconventional as that in Cyprus. Although not an autonomous state, the Palestinian authority is largely recognised and has been given support to govern over certain territories, unlike the TRNC. This essay has seen how 'crisis diplomacy' was used in 1974 to secure a relatively swift cease-fire following the Turkish invasion, showing clearly that diplomacy is not confined to embassies and conferences, but direct high-level communications

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<sup>15</sup> Gordon, P.H., "Talking Turkey on Cyprus" in *The Washington Times* (16<sup>th</sup> January 2002)

<sup>16</sup> From George W. Bush's 'State of the Union' speech in 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Cook, S. A., *Analysis Paper #9, America's response to Terrorism*, (6<sup>th</sup> Nov., 2001) from [http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fellows/2001\\_cook.htm](http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fellows/2001_cook.htm)

often provide a simpler and more effective means of diplomacy. Also, the examination of the 'public diplomacy' of lobbying foreign governments and influencing foreign policy has shown how both the Cypriot Greek and Cypriot Turk sides have effectively used such means. This has involved both informal 'pressure groups' such as the 'Turkish Cypriot Network' which can lobby, as well as having influence within governments or parliaments, such as the 'Friends of Turkish Cypriots' in the UK, or as some have claimed, George Stephanopoulos. Issues regarding EU enlargement have dominated much of the recent speculation of Cyprus. This essay has shown how all parties have used diplomatic approaches through the EU, such as summits, to influence the policy of the EU, by both appealing to such founding principles as 'the freedoms of movement, settlement and property' and 'self-determination'. Also, the possible use of veto to block defence arrangements between the EU and NATO has no doubt influenced policy of many states. Also the Cypriot Greek led government of Cyprus' application for EU membership itself put pressure on the Cypriot Turk side, as this essay has explained, the Turkish forces would become officially foreign forces in occupation. Finally, this essay has seen how the 'War on Terrorism' has possibly extended the avenues open to Turkey to win support. This essay did eschew the direct negotiations between the Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek sides on the grounds that they did not act 'to win support'. Although this remains accurate, the context of these negotiations does act in this sense, as the two sides' claim being more receptive to the negotiations. Other factors omitted from this essay, for various reasons, include the role of the UN as mediator and the economic embargo placed on the 'TRNC' by Cyprus and the EU at large. Given all these factors, this essay has found that although the situation allows for little formal, conventional diplomatic efforts, other forms of diplomacy have played key roles and these cannot be ignored. A solution to the conflict requires support of many 'outside' interests, including the EU, UN and NATO most obviously, and the key participants of this dispute have used many diplomatic approaches to gain advantage for their position.

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